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<CN>6</CN> 
<CT>Cycles of Narrative Necessity</CT> 
<CST>Suspect Tellers and the Textuality of Fictional Minds</CST> 
<CA>Maria Mäkelä</CA> 
 
A narratologist who happens to be mainly interested in literary 
fiction should not feel impeded by the cognitive turn and the 
ensuing erosion of disciplinary borders. On the contrary: now 
that we acknowledge the presence of narrative everywhere and 
embrace every social situation as a lesson in mind reading, it 
seems that reading literary narratives has come to be considered 
a privileged form of intercognitive activity. The study of 
fictional minds has been given a boost by theorists such as 
Monika Fludernik, David Herman, Uri Margolin, Alan Palmer, and 
Lisa Zunshine, who have blended literary analysis with "real-
mind discourses" (see Palmer 2004, 4), and with most persuasive 
results. But beyond "drawing on tools from the cognitive 
sciences to develop new descriptive and explanatory techniques 
for the study of fictional mental functioning," literary 
narratologists are in a position to suggest how "more careful 
scrutiny of fictional minds can help illuminate the 'real minds' 
. . . on which specialists in the cognitive sciences have 
traditionally focused" (Herman 2003, 23). The literary minds of 
Richardson's Clarissa, Austen's Emma, and Nabokov's Humbert 
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Humbert have thus ended up not just as subjects of cognitive-
psychological vivisection but also as illustrations of actual 
human cognition as well as tools for understanding the mental 
processes of real minds. And why not? One of the goals of 
literary experimentation has been—at least from the early 
modernist to the late modernist era—to depict the mind "as it 
is," be it verbalized, streaming, intersubjective, unconscious, 
or fragmented. 
 Yet the recent use of ideas from the cognitive sciences to 
naturalize fictional minds departs from the emphases of early 
narratologists such as Käte Hamburger and Dorrit Cohn: for these 
scholars, the representation of fictional consciousness is 
precisely what distinguishes novelistic discourse from other 
kinds of discourse, narrative fiction being the only 
representational mode to grant us a look inside other people's 
heads (see Hamburger 1993, 81–89; Cohn 1978, 5–7, and 1999, 117–
23). Alan Palmer's pathbreaking study on fictional minds 
critiques Cohnian notions of consciousness representation, 
claiming that structuralist analysis focused exclusively on the 
verbal aspects of fictional mind construction—to the exclusion 
of other, nonverbal aspects (Palmer 2004, 9–12). Making 
acquaintance with fictional characters may indeed bear more 
resemblance to a real-life cocktail party where everybody tries 
to figure out other people than to meticulous linguistic 
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analysis where alleged thought-segments are classified as 
direct, indirect, and free indirect discourse. Palmer succeeds 
in broadening the notion of fictional minds from verbal to 
nonverbal  mental functioning,  and as such  his theoretical 
arguments are more illuminating than reductive. Yet, despite the 
benefits of these new approaches to studying fictional minds, 
for me George Butte's response to Paul John Eakin's (2004) 
cognitive-psychological analysis of autobiographical writing 
still resonates: "Would improved knowledge of, say, the superior 
colliculus's communication with the thalamus . . . eventually 
clarify the functioning of free indirect discourse?" (Butte 
2005, 300). 
 This chapter aims at a constructive critique of those 
"cognitivist"1 developments in literary theory that—to my mind—
may lead to reductive views on fictional consciousness 
representation. My concern is twofold. First, I believe that by 
reducing fictional minds to exempla of actual human cognition we 
miss the essential dynamics between verbal art and real-life 
experientiality. Second, if we assume that reading literary 
fiction requires the use of exactly the same cognitive frames we 
use when coping with our everyday lives, we will suffer serious 
literary-theoretical  losses. At times the argumentation in this 
chapter may raise suspicions of a nostalgic plea for formalist 
notions of narrative art as autonomous and estranging in its 
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relation to the real world and to actual human cognition. 
Indeed, in the context of the volume at hand, I wish to 
emphasize the peculiarly textual and constructed nature of 
literary experientiality. One does not necessarily have to 
embrace Cohn's (1999) somewhat uncompromising distinction 
between factual and fictional narratives to appreciate her 
earlier (1978) formulations concerning the unique nature of 
fictional minds: for Cohn, the same narrative techniques used to 
achieve the highest degree of psychological vraisemblance (such 
as free indirect discourse) are the most literary or, in a sense 
I discuss below, the most "unnatural" techniques. As Cohn puts 
it, "[i]n depicting the inner life, the novelist is truly a 
fabricator" (1978, 6). Thus the capacity for mimesis of the mind 
constitutes both the essence and the great paradox of novelistic 
discourse. 
 In what follows, I will argue for the distinctiveness of 
fictional minds by analyzing two literary texts in which making 
sense of the narrating protagonist's "cognitive mental 
functioning" (see Palmer 2003; Margolin 2003) presents a 
pressing interpretive challenge. My aim is not, however, to 
adduce alien modes of consciousness representation and thereby 
prove that, in the context of literary fiction, we are indeed 
dealing with something that is radically different from our own 
cognitive mental functioning. In other words, my purpose is not 
From Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative edited by Lars Bernaerts, et al. by permission 
of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2013 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska.
236 
to add to the catalogs  of types of "unnatural narration" being 
developed within the emerging field of "unnatural narratology" 
(see especially Richardson 2006; Abbott 2008; Alber et al. 2010; 
Alber and Heinze 2011;  Hansen et al. 2011). Instead, my two 
test cases, both of them short stories by Richard Ford from the 
collection A Multitude of Sins (2002), are, at first glance, 
strikingly unexceptional; and this is precisely the reason for 
their choice as examples. Both narratives display textual and 
narrative techniques that are effective in evoking a sense of 
both cognitive familiarity and cognitive estrangement. Further, 
it is the dynamic interplay between naturalization and 
denaturalization—assimilation and estrangement—that I take to be 
the hallmark of readers' engagements with fictional minds. 
 In the collection's opening story, "Privacy," a first-
person narrator confesses to having stalked—for a few times—a 
female neighbor undressing in an opposing window. The story is 
conveyed to us as the protagonist tries both to confess and to 
relive his past sensations. However, the narrator only hints at 
the consequences of his actions and enigmatically refers to 
these subsequent events as the "first cycle of necessity" in his 
life. In the other story,  "Reunion," we encounter another 
first-person confessor: the protagonist tells a story of how—as 
he specifies, "before Christmas last year"—he happened to spot 
his ex-mistress's husband in the midst of a crowd at Grand 
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Central station. Disturbingly, both the narrator and the 
experiencing I try to reconstruct this moment as the climax in a 
story that would otherwise remain just plain old adultery-
turned-ennui. 
 These stories display narrative situations where the first-
person narrators seem to operate within the "natural" frames of 
narrativization (as defined by Fludernik 1996) and reflect 
experientiality (Fludernik 1996, 12–13, 28–30; or "qualia," 
Herman 2007a, 256–57). However, at the same time, these 
narratives create an effect of false or projected 
experientiality, displacement of agency, and displacement of 
narrative focus, even to the point of questioning the narrators' 
authority as verisimilar "tellers." Instead of merely activating 
our theory of mind,  these narrators disclose the textual and 
intentional designs of their minds. In Ford's stories, the 
illusion of subjective, unmediated experience is constantly 
undermined by the narrator's need to organize his story into a 
meaningful, coherent (even artistic) whole—and vice versa. What 
we end up with are conflicting cycles of narrative necessity: 
Whose hand actually draws the cycle of narrative coherence? Does 
the hand belong to the experiencing I, the narrating I, or  the 
reader? 
 Ultimately, with these not-quite-naturalizable stories, I 
wish to question some of the premises of prototype-driven 
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cognitive narratology, as well as some aspects of its emergent 
narratological counterforce, unnatural narratology and its 
pronounced avoidance of the conventional. On the one hand, as 
cogently demonstrated by leading figures of unnatural 
narratology (Alber et al. 2010), an interdisciplinary reliance 
on shared narrative schemata—along with the notion of naturally 
occurring narratives as the default (cf. Herman 2007a, 9; Ryan 
2007, 24)—directs us away from the anti-mimetic (see also Mäkelä 
2006). On the other hand, I am not convinced by the account of 
literary realism that the unnatural approach seems to 
presuppose; according to the argument of Alber et al. (2010), 
"ordinary realist texts" appear at the same end of the natural-
unnatural axis as naturally occurring ("natural") narratives 
(114). This claim strikes me as a misreading of Fludernik's idea 
of a natural narratology, since the starting point of her theory 
is not the plausibility of the events presented in a given 
narrative (in contrast to the "physically and logically 
impossible" emphasized in Alber et al. 2010; see also Alber 
2009)  but instead the real-world anchoring experiential 
schemata shared by the teller and the reader. The point is made 
even clearer when we notice that one of the main cases treated 
by David Herman (see, e.g., 2007b, 6–7) is a ghost story, 
obviously "physically and logically unnatural," yet still 
evoking natural frames of storytelling. At the same time, 
From Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative edited by Lars Bernaerts, et al. by permission 
of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2013 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska.
239 
stories with realistic settings  or, for that matter, novels of 
mainstream classical realism may well present the most unnatural 
communicative and experiential situations whose thematic import 
is not affected by conventionalization. In fact, Alber et al. 
(2010) also point toward this possibility in the conclusion of 
their essay (131). 
 At the same time, researchers hailing from the camp of 
narrative psychology and sociology, instead of settling for the 
unproblematic prototype model of an integrational, coherence-
driven, and firmly subjective narrative, have likewise directed 
their attention to increasingly problematic stories and 
narrative agencies (see  especially  Hydén and Brockmeier 2008; 
Hyvärinen et al. 2010). Combined with the considerations 
discussed in my previous paragraph, this work suggests that the 
distinction between naturally occurring and literary narratives 
is far from being clear-cut. This complex relationship between 
the natural and the literary will be one of the starting points 
of my analysis of Ford's two short stories, which point to the 
possibility of distinctive literary-textual mechanisms—
mechanisms that foreground types of experientiality and 
narrative design different from those attaching to stories 
encountered in our social environment. Another point I would 
like to make through these analyses is that we do not have to 
resort to avant-garde literature to realize that the potential 
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unnaturalness—or the peculiarly literary type of cognitive 
challenge—is always already there in textual representations of 
consciousness (see also Tammi 2008, 46); what makes it 
perceivable is the way making sense of fictional minds requires 
a to-and-fro movement between establishing and transcending 
natural frames of experience and narrativization. 
 
<A>Troublingly Natural Confessions?</A> 
What would be a more mundane narrative act than an intimate 
confession from one person to another? As Samuli Hägg remarks in 
his discussion of Fludernik's Towards a "Natural" Narratology, 
the first-person narrative situation, the form most easily 
graspable in the cognitive frame of "telling,"  should be the 
"<'>home-base' of Natural narrativity" (Hägg 2006, 181), the 
mode of narration most unlikely to cause cognitive estrangement. 
As Fludernik's theory of "natural narratology"  has it, all 
storytelling  and story processing  is based on experientiality, 
"the quasi-mimetic evocation of 'real life experience'" 
(Fludernik 1996, 12). The narrative situation in the short story 
"Privacy" should thus be well tuned with our real-life cognitive 
parameters: it seems we have a troubled man confessing a chain 
of events and his own reaction to them, which resulted in 
failures both in his marriage and in his work as a writer. 
Already the title "Privacy," as well as the opening sentence—
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"This was at a time when my marriage was still happy"—call for 
interpretive strategies acquired in everyday oral narrative 
situations: this is something we could hear in a pub. After a 
while, the narrator-protagonist breaks off from the iterative 
description of his habitual married life of earlier days and 
goes back to the moment when he—for the first time—takes a pair 
of silver opera glasses from a drawer and yields to his nightly 
obsession. 
 
<EXT>(1) I don't know all that I thought. Undoubtedly I was 
aroused. Undoubtedly I was thrilled by the secrecy of watching 
out of the dark. Undoubtedly I loved the very illicitness of it, 
of my wife sleeping nearby and knowing nothing of what I was 
doing. It is also possible I even liked the cold as it 
surrounded me, as complete as the night itself, may even have 
felt that the sight of the woman—whom I took to be young and 
lacking caution or discretion—held me somehow, insulated me and 
made the world stop and be perfectly expressible as two poles 
connected by my line of vision. I am sure now that all of this 
had to do with my impending failures. ("Privacy," 5)</EXT> 
 
The narration evokes the natural frame of retrospection—
indicated by gaps in memory that are only to be expected. But, 
at the same time, we get an uncannily vivid description of the 
From Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative edited by Lars Bernaerts, et al. by permission 
of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2013 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska.
242 
intense coldness and secrecy of the moment. The narrator 
distances himself by modalizing expressions ("It is also 
possible I even liked . . . may even have felt . . ."), doubts 
his memory, and shifts the focus to the moment of narration by 
alluding to the possibly severe consequences of his peeping 
activities. We are led to believe that these consequences are 
what prompt the narrator's confession, but we never actually 
hear about the "failures" he alludes to at the end of the 
passage. 
 Using classical narratological terms, we see here a 
peculiar combination of dissonant and consonant first-person 
narration: the narrator is both distancing himself from his 
earlier experience and reliving it. However, if we look closer 
at Cohn's original definitions of dissonance and consonance, we 
find that, in these terms, the narrator also fails at both 
strategies. With all his doubts and inconsistencies, he is 
neither "the enlightened and knowing narrator who elucidates his 
mental confusions of earlier days" nor "a narrator who closely 
identifies with his past self, betraying no manner of superior 
knowledge" (Cohn 1978, 143). Can the flash-like, illuminated—
"enlightened"—vision be a product of the narrating I's superior 
interpretive ability? Or is it an impression already gained 
during the incident, perhaps only suppressed until the moment of 
recounting? Using Fludernik's cognitive angle, we end up with 
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much the same result: there is some serious overlapping and 
ambivalence between prototype models of narrative mediacy. The 
frame of "telling"  (somebody recounting what happened) 
triggered earlier starts to give way to the emerging cognitive 
frame of "experiencing"  (deictic and psychological transition 
to the narrated past moment; reader's alleged access to "what is 
it like"). It seems that the passage quoted in (1) offers not 
one but two "models of the human mind at work" (see Margolin 
1999, 165)—two cognitive mappings of the same situation—which, 
moreover, seem to be pulling the rug out from under each other. 
The narrator's insistence that he does not quite remember what 
he thought and the use of modalizing expressions build up into 
an interpretive dilemma: where does the experiential focus lie, 
in the retrospective act of the narrating I, or in the 
perceptions of the protagonist's earlier self? 
 And yet, this is still something we could hear in a pub. 
Or, depending on how we interpret the "impending failures" the 
narrator alludes to, perhaps during a police interrogation or a 
testimony. One of the established narratological reading 
strategies used to humanize fictional narrators is diagnosing 
them as unreliable. This strategy may well provide motivation 
for the dissonances in passage (1) and turn them into either a 
conscious (rhetorical) or an unconscious (psychological) 
strategy:2 "A-ha! He remembers quite a lot, after all!" The 
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thematic context of the narrative may even encourage such a 
diagnostic reading: the story is the first one in a collection 
of stories on adultery, thick with psychological undercurrents. 
However, condemning the narrator for unreliability—either for 
glossing over his "crime" or for self-denial—is, ultimately, 
just as unproductive an interpretation as condemning him for 
adultery. As Peter Brooks argues in his aptly titled work 
Troubling Confessions, both real and fictional confessions are 
verbal performatives that actually create the inwardness of the 
person confessing (Brooks 2000, 2). Passage (1) from "Privacy" 
could thus be read as a representative example of this process: 
the inwardness—or experientiality—is created by linguistic 
means, by a shift from doubtful modality into an illustrated 
report on the past sensation. In this manner, the narrator 
actually brings to mind the sorts of false confessions that 
Brooks discusses in the context of legal history. We may be 
prompted to ask questions similar to those raised by Brooks: Is  
the confessor creating his past or present inner states? And 
furthermore, is it the language that creates the criminal mind, 
retrospectively? Confession is just as much a fabrication, a 
performance (Brooks 2000, 21), as is the consequent "cognitive 
mental functioning" that we believe shows through this verbal 
act. 
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 Ford's "Reunion" has the same air of confession, or of a 
personal reckoning. The story's narrative situation is framed by 
the narrator's attempt to recount his encounter with the man he 
has cuckolded, Mack Bolger, but as becomes evident, he has more 
than this to unload on his audience: 
 
<EXT>(2) What went on between Beth Bolger and me is hardly worth 
the words that would be required to explain it away. At any 
distance but the close range I saw it from, it was an ordinary 
adultery.  . . . Because it is the truth and serves to 
complicate Mack Bolger's unlikeable dilemma and to cast him in a 
more sympathetic light, I will say that at some point he was 
forced to confront me (and Beth as well) in a hotel room in St. 
Louis . . . with the result that I got banged around in a minor 
way.  ("Reunion," 66)</EXT> 
 
The narrators of "Privacy" and "Reunion" both suggest the 
pertinence of Meir Sternberg's (2005) remarks about the 
"transmission-mindedness" of narrative agents: their discourse 
is very much audience-oriented. However, on reading example (1), 
although we could have been sitting in a pub or in a courtroom 
listening to an oral narrative, we had, or at least should have, 
an uncanny feeling of double or constructed experientiality. 
Example (2), for its part, makes even more explicit the 
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connection between addressing an audience and constructing one's 
confession. The quoted passage reveals the narrator's self-
reflexivity not just as a confessor who wants to tell the truth  
but also as a narrator who wants to cast a particular kind of 
light on his story—and moreover, on his characters. Later we 
learn that the protagonist's obsessive attempts to paint a 
psychologically "round" portrait of Mack Bolger—which would at 
the same time serve as a tribute to the deceived man and as an 
atonement for the betrayal—form one of the main thematic threads 
of the story. For now, however, suffice it to say that both 
examples suggest not just transmission-mindedness but 
construction-mindedness. 
 
<A>Projected Experientiality and Displacement of Agency</A> 
So far I have pointed out some conversational elements in my 
test cases that are likely to trigger natural frames of 
narrativization and mind reading. In the following I try to 
highlight the nature of literary narrative as a multi-level 
cognitive performance. Drawing on Fludernik's account of the 
dominating function of "consciousness" in narrative (Fludernik 
1996, 49–50), I highlight one sentence I think holds especially 
true for narrative fiction: "this consciousness [i.e.,  the 
consciousness mediating the narrative] can surface on several 
levels and in different shapes" (1996, 49). The mediacy brought 
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about by literary minds is different—if not radically different—
from the real-world mediating functions of consciousness, since 
the processes of literary mediation and world-construction are 
necessarily multilayered.  Consequently, it may prove impossible 
to separate transmission-mindedness from construction-
mindedness. My two test cases demonstrate that the literary 
construction of experience disturbs our attempts to naturalize 
the minds of the protagonists as either tellers or subjects of 
experience. Their minds are ultimately private, and yet they 
reflect the features of literary communication. Thus the 
distinction in literary fiction between internal and external—or 
between experiencing, thinking, and speaking—turns out to be 
problematic. 
 When the protagonist of "Privacy" finally gets a closer 
look of the woman he has been peeping at, he finds out that this 
Chinese woman is surprisingly old. 
 
<EXT>(3) When I stopped and looked at her she turned and gazed 
down the steps at me with an expression I can only think now was 
indifference mingled with just the smallest recognition of 
threat. She was old, after all. I might suddenly have felt the 
urge to harm her, and easily could've. But of course that was 
not my thought. . . . I said nothing, did not even look at her 
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again. I didn't want her to think my mind contained what it did 
and also what it did not. ("Privacy," 7)</EXT> 
 
What sort of mediating consciousnesses are at work in this 
passage? This is the only instance in the story where the mind 
of the protagonist interacts with another mind and thus gives 
evidence of embodied mind reading,  an aspect of fictional 
consciousness representation that has been the focus of recent 
research (see Zunshine 2006; Butte 2004; Palmer 2004; Mäkelä 
2006). It also displays the same overlap among telling, 
experiencing, and (re)construction as in example (1). We can see 
how modalities ("Undoubtedly I was aroused," "may even have 
felt") turn, at the end of the story, into complete negation: 
the narrator reports what he did not think. But do we believe 
him? If we have a closer look at the sentence "I might suddenly 
have felt the urge to harm her, and easily could've," we can 
come up with at least three different interpretations: (1)  the 
possibility of violence crosses the mind of the narrator only at 
the moment of recounting; or (2)  the sentence does produce the 
past sensation of the experiencing I; this possibility is 
implied when the narrator says he did not  want the woman to 
think what he was or was not  thinking; or (3)  we can read the 
sentence as a free indirect discourse-like approximation of the 
woman's thought (that man may want to harm me and easily could). 
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This third interpretation, however, loops back into the other 
two: the narrator-protagonist projects his own violent and 
abusive obsessions into the woman's unnecessary fear. 
 The passage does not so much give an account of a true 
encounter with an other—of "deep intersubjectivity" (Butte 
2004)—as it displaces the protagonist's own experience. In this 
connection, note that cognitively oriented studies on the 
interaction between literary minds are mainly interested in the 
horizontal relations between "cognizers." Less attention has 
been paid to vertical symmetries, contradictions, and overlaps 
in the cognitive mental functioning of characters, narrators, 
and their audiences. In this exemplary case, the main tension 
arises not from social relations (the real-life-like 
intersubjective communication on which, for example, Alan Palmer 
grounds some of his claims about fictional minds)  but from the 
textual and structural interconnections among cognizers, as well 
as on their frames for producing and interpreting the narrative. 
The cognitive trick lies in the fact that in literary 
representation, telling, experiencing,  and the construction of 
the fictional world and its agents all happen on the same level—
that of narrative discourse. We have no 3-D model  of embedded 
consciousnesses,  but only a syntactic-linear display from which 
the reader's mind has to infer the relevant levels of mediation 
(see figs.  6.1 and 6.2). 
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<F6.1> 
<F6.2> 
 
 Lisa Zunshine makes a very illuminating observation in 
claiming that narrative fiction tests and teases our mind-
reading capacity by providing us with characters whose mental 
states we must infer from their behavior, or whose intentions we 
must "track down" from the representation by using our 
"metarepresentational capacity" (Zunshine 2006). Yet, instead of 
displaying all the levels of intention involved, like the New 
Yorker cartoon that Zunshine uses as her introductory example 
("Of course I care about how you imagined I thought you 
perceived I wanted you to feel"   [2006, 30]), narrative 
discourse in fiction more often than not hides the agencies 
behind cognitive activity, as suggested by example (3) above. 
Moreover, the task of "keep[ing] track of who thought, wanted, 
and felt what and when" (2006, 5) requires that the reader 
consider the hierarchical nature of narrative and thus the 
vertical relations between fictional agents: On  which diegetic 
level are things perceived, experienced, processed, verbalized, 
constructed, or reflected? Does the cognitive agency manifest 
itself on the level of the former, experiencing I, on the level 
of the extradiegetic telling I, or on the level of the actual 
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reader? And if the cognitive activities situated on different 
hierarchical levels overlap, what happens to processes of 
naturalization? 
 However, even after all the effort I have put into 
demonstrating how experientiality is defamiliarized in the story 
of the Peeping Tom and the old Chinese woman, the same pressing 
question, posed by natural narratology, remains: might we not 
hear this in a pub? It is one thing to claim that textual 
representations of intercognitive activity are not congruent 
with social dynamics between real human minds; it is another 
thing to prove that a fictional sequence narrated in the first 
person would be unimaginable as a sequence of conversational 
storytelling. Thus, to develop a model nuanced enough to capture 
the interplay between naturalization and defamiliarization in 
readers' engagement with fictional minds, instead of proposing a 
dichotomy  between everyday minds and the minds created in 
literary fiction, I suggest the relevance of processes of 
foregrounding—in the sense specified in stylistics research. In 
other words, even the slightest deviances from cognitive 
verisimilitude generated by the textuality and narrative 
determination of fictional minds will inevitably call for 
reading strategies different from those applied in real-world 
social navigation. 
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 As Uri Margolin points out, "[t]hrough its use of 
nonstandard, often strongly deviant or deficient manners of 
narration, literature makes us aware ex negativo of the default 
clause, the standard or normal mechanisms and patterns of 
information processing" (2003, 277). Furthermore, for Margolin, 
it is precisely a "breakdown or failure" in fictional cognitive 
mechanisms that supplies the most effective "tool" for 
understanding the actual human mind (278). This formulation in 
many ways goes straight to the point, but still it seems that 
Margolin takes a shortcut from "manners of narration" to "our 
own mental functioning." Are we to be defamiliarized from 
conventions of thought or rather from conventions of writing? If 
we take another look at example (1), we may notice how 
defamiliarization works both ways. On one hand, the passage's 
opening sentence,  "I don't know all that I thought,"  violates 
not the natural frames of storytelling but the conventions of 
first-person narrative fiction,  where we are likely to confront 
narrators with an extraordinary memory (see Cohn 1978, 162; 
Nielsen 2004, 135–36). Who in the world would remember all he 
thought, except for Marcel in À la recherche du temps perdu? But 
on the other hand, when the memory of the narrator starts to 
come alive miraculously and the experience of the narrator's 
past self is vivified in front of our eyes, we are situated in 
the realm of literary frames, inside which immediate access to 
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another consciousness, no matter how distant in time, is 
something to be expected (see Fludernik 1996, 48). Thus example 
(1) both instantiates and departs from the conventions of 
literary narrative, and thereby both transgresses and conforms 
to conventions associated with everyday storytelling. 
 Despite Margolin's claims, however, this complex structure 
of norm-confirmation and norm-violation does not point to the 
deviant mental functioning of the protagonist. The deviance, 
rather, seems to be created in and by the narrative discourse: 
the fictional mind is diegetic and mimetic at the same time; 
experiencing and telling are equally foregrounded in the "flat" 
discourse of narrative prose. This textual effect is reinforced 
by passage (3) toward  the end of the story, where experiential 
agency is radically displaced by negation. The thought of 
violence must have been experienced by the protagonist at some 
point; furthermore, what is the difference between what his mind 
"contained" and "what it did not"?  The hypothesis of the 
woman's fearful thoughts, created with the help of the 
protagonist's theory of mind,  reveals experientiality behind 
the words, even if it is of the embedded or of the projected 
type. In any case, the discourse encloses both what the mind 
contained and what it did not. Even while acknowledging this, we 
do not have to resort to diagnosing the protagonist as a 
schizophrenic. 
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 All in all, "Privacy" may ask, via its themes and 
techniques, the same question we find at the core of cognitive 
science: what does it mean for a mind to contain something? Some 
additional questions, focusing on more literary issues, are 
raised as well: What is the relationship between a mind 
"containing" and a mind verbalizing, narrativizing, or 
constructing an experience? What is the relationship between 
cognitive and literary construction? These are the types of 
questions that we, as literary theorists, should be asking as 
well. The story further touches upon one fundamental difference 
between an experience lived and an experience read: literary 
experientiality is always, by nature, projected. In his 
confrontation with the old woman the protagonist seems to dwell 
on the same kind of second-degree experientiality as the reader 
when entering a fictional character's experiential plane. 
 The narrator of "Reunion" is more explicit in his 
construction-mindedness—in his urge to create experientiality. 
Consequently, the problematic relationship between mental and 
literary construction remains more foregrounded than it does in 
"Privacy." 
 
<EXT>(4) I was taken by a sudden and strange impulse—which was 
to walk straight across through the eddying sea of travelers and 
speak to him, just as one might speak to anyone you casually 
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knew and had unexpectedly yet not unhappily encountered. And not 
to impart anything, or set in motion any particular action (to 
clarify history, for instance, or make amends), but simply to 
create an event where before there was none. And not an 
unpleasant event, or a provocative one. Just a dimensionless, 
unreverberant moment, a contact, unimportant in every other 
respect. ("Reunion," 67)</EXT> 
 
This passage displays telling, constructing, and experiencing 
not only as intermixed but also in a cognitively reverse order: 
narrative construction precedes the experience. The reader may 
be further puzzled by the motivation given by the narrator for 
his urge to create a signifying "reunion" between himself and 
Mack Bolger: not to "set in motion any particular action," and 
so on. This is, I would say, a very anti-cognitivist view of 
narrative dynamics: not to create sequences in order to approach 
something in terms of causality, "[b]ut simply to create an 
event where before there was none." The narrator's activity 
seems to come closer to that of an author or an auteur rather 
than that of a conversational storyteller. But, again, we may 
see the realistic psychological motivation showing through: the 
guilt-ridden ex-lover escaping into aesthetics and not 
clarifying what really should be clarified, not making the 
amends that should, perhaps, be made. 
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<EXT>(5) Everything Beth and I had done was gone. All that 
remained was this—a series of moments in the great train 
terminal, moments which, in spite of all, seemed correct, 
sturdy, almost classical in character, as if this later time was 
all that really mattered whereas the previous, briefly 
passionate, linked but now-distant moments were merely 
preliminary. ("Reunion," 71)</EXT> 
 
When the protagonist, wandering through the grand terminal, 
really gets his machinery for narrativization going, he seems to 
substitute his former non-causal conviction for a new kind of 
causality that  allows the narrative weight of adultery to be 
diminished in favor of the "classical" scene he himself will 
create. As indicated  in example (2), the protagonist's 
narrative urge expends itself also on the character of Mack 
Bolger, who—at least for a while—becomes the protagonist's 
creation: "as though in a peculiar way the man I saw was not 
Mack Bolger but a good-looking effigy situated precisely there 
to attract my attention" (66). 
 In both stories, our own frames for reading are further 
complicated by the self-reflexive construction-mindedness of the 
narrators. Both are anything but ignorant of the artistic 
dimensions of framing. In "Privacy," the narrator peeps through 
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a pair of opera glasses like some Nabokovian hero. Furthermore, 
example (1), with its Kandinsky- or Mondrian-like abstractions 
of perception and space, foregrounds the narrator's capability 
for self-conscious framing. On a thematic level, both stories 
can also be read as narratives of artistic failure. In "Reunion" 
the protagonist ultimately fails in creating a "moment," whereas 
in "Privacy" the "impending failures" that the narrator alludes 
to—apart from clearly referring to marital problems—can also be 
interpreted as his bankruptcy as a writer. The narrators' 
narrativization of their own experience by projecting and 
reframing comes close to the work of a fiction writer, but it 
also weakens their agency both as "centers of consciousness" in 
the narrated world and as tellers. 
 The feelings of not exactly being there, of not exactly 
telling or   experiencing, may be familiar to most of us. The 
stories analyzed here reflect such perceptual, emotional, 
verbal,  and narrative displacement,  but they appear to achieve 
those effects through their textual design. I now move on to 
discuss these macro-structural displacements in both stories and 
their effects on readers' attempts to naturalize the narrators' 
experiences and their (subsequent?) acts of telling. 
 
<A>After Closure</A> 
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"Privacy" and "Reunion" seem to evoke a sense of failure, not 
only in marital, social, or psychological terms  but also in 
terms of the characters' construction of their experiences in 
narrative terms. In a way, those shortcomings might suggest the 
kind of "breakdown or failure" in cognitive mechanisms that  
Margolin regards as essential for cognitive estrangement in 
literature. Yet these effects cannot be properly analyzed 
without considering the way the stories are structured as 
fictional narratives. How does the outer cycle define the inner 
one, the author's textual design comprehend and structure the 
character-narrator's act of telling? 
 A sample of three sentences gives us an overall view of 
"Privacy"; the narrative, like a canopy, is stretched between 
these three sentences. 
 
<EXT>(6<SC>a</SC>) [the opening sentence:] This was at a time 
when my marriage was still happy. ("Privacy," 3) 
 (6<SC>b</SC>) [the approximate middle of the story:] I am 
sure now that all of this had to do with my impending failures. 
("Privacy," 5) 
 (6<SC>c</SC>) [the closing sentence:] . . . my life 
entering, as it was at that moment, its first, long cycle of 
necessity. ("Privacy," 7)</EXT> 
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These are the sentences that really frame the whole narrative—
and they all point outside its own "cycle." The dominant feeling 
after reading this story is that you never actually got the 
chance to hear it. The real story concerns the cycles of 
necessity that  follow from the narrated events. It seems that 
as readers we are victimized by the nature of the fictional 
universe as a closed system. A police interrogator, or even a 
random acquaintance in a pub, would not drop the matter here but 
ask further questions; for the reader, the cycle closes. 
Something similar happens in "Reunion" when we learn that the 
hero fails to create a climax in his encounter with Mack Bolger 
at the railway station. 
 
<EXT>(7) "Nothing happened today," Mack Bolger said. "Don't go 
away thinking anything happened here. Between you and me, I 
mean. Nothing happened. I'm sorry I ever met you, that's all. 
Sorry I ever had to touch you. You make me feel ashamed." 
("Reunion," 73; emphasis in the original) 
 
<1L#> 
 
(8) I had, of course, been wrong about the linkage of moments, 
and about what was preliminary and what was primary. It was a 
mistake, one I would not make again. None of it was a good thing 
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to have done. Though it is such a large city here, so much 
larger than, say, St. Louis, I knew I would not see him again. 
("Reunion," 74)</EXT> 
 
In example  (7) we read Mack Bolger absolutely refusing to play 
the part that the other man has constructed for him: "Nothing 
happened today," he says. "Don't go away thinking anything 
happened here." Example (8) is the closing chapter of the story, 
showing us how the narrator admits being mistaken about the 
narrative dynamics and causalities. He also mentions St. Louis 
in passing—the setting, as the reader may well remember, for the 
truly significant encounter during which he "got banged around 
in a minor way" in a hotel room. Finally, it seems he ends up 
telling us something that he ultimately considers not worth 
telling. But why has the narrating I not revised his version of 
"the linkage of moments"? He is, after all, telling something 
that, as he says himself, happened "before Christmas last year," 
and so he has had all that time to revise his account. 
 So finally, what we end up with are conflicting cycles of 
narrative necessity—and by those I mean conflicting aspirations 
toward  narrative closure, in the sense defined by H. Porter 
Abbott: as "the satisfaction of expectations and the answering 
of questions raised over the course of any narrative" (2005, 65–
66). In both stories, it is as if some narrative pullback 
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mechanism kept returning the focus from the narrated events to 
the moment of narration. This process may reinforce our 
impression of the narrators as confessors with an audience in 
mind. But, then again, both narrators end up telling something 
that does not illustrate their own positions. Nor do their 
stories create narrative causality in any conventional sense. 
Indeed, these stories seem to be following a kind of ex negativo 
principle, since (1)  the experiential impulse for narration 
seems to come from outside the narrated events, and (2)  the 
reader has the same kind of nagging feeling about both 
narrators: this is not what they would tell us—or anyone—if they 
had a choice. 
 These narrators are very likely to possess a narrative urge 
to mold their lived experiences into well-formed stories with a 
satisfying closure. Yet as we read their stories it seems that 
they violate precisely such a cognitive-scientific ideal of 
narrative functioning as a recovery formula. Galen Strawson 
(2004) has expressed his vehement objection to the 
"psychological narrativity thesis" (we all process our 
experiences into a narrative) as well as to the "ethical 
narrativity thesis" (narrative understanding of life as a 
prerequisite for self-understanding and morally sound behavior), 
and the critique, it seems, has hit some nerve in the body of 
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contemporary narrative theory (see responses, e.g., by Phelan 
2005 and Battersby 2006). 
 In a way, my chosen examples hit that same nerve by 
refusing "cognitive closure"; yet, at the same time, they attest 
to the role of the "ethical narrativity thesis" in the 
narrators' own self-narrations—though along with the narrative 
agency and focus, the "moral" of these stories also seems 
somehow misplaced. Unable to achieve any sort of atonement, the 
narrator of "Reunion" contents himself with admitting that 
"[n]one of it was a good thing to have done." As Pekka Tammi 
suggests, against the cognitive grain, this kind of questioning 
of narrative unity is precisely what narrative literature is 
for: "[Is  it] not the capacity of literary fiction—unlike that 
of standard narratives evoked by theorists—to deal specifically 
with the impossibilities, the paradoxes and problems, of our 
human efforts to order experience?" (2006, 30; emphasis in the 
original). 
 But how conscious are the narrating characters of their 
narrative efforts, ultimately? Meir Sternberg (2005) has called 
narratologists' attention to a significant but largely ignored 
feature of literary representation: the ambivalent status of 
fictional agents as both mimetic entities and conveyors of 
representation. Indeed, we can imagine the protagonists of 
"Privacy" and "Reunion" shuttling on a scale ranging from highly 
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self-conscious and context-conscious tellers to solitary 
introverts unself-consciously (perhaps unwillingly) exposing 
their secret or even suppressed inner selves (cf. Sternberg 
2005, 33). Theoretically, we would be hard pressed  to prove 
that in some particular segment of narration (e.g.,  in the 
sentence "I don't know all that I thought") we would have, 
either on linguistic, structural,  or even  "cognitive" grounds, 
an informed teller-person present, whereas in some other segment 
of the same narrative (such as in "I might suddenly have felt 
the urge to harm her, and easily could've") we appear suddenly 
to lose this teller. But even if it were possible, an analysis 
of this sort would only flatten the narrative dynamics produced 
by the "shuttling." It is the multi-level, multi-cognitive 
structure of literary representation that allows for the frames 
of "telling" and "experiencing"  to prevail at the same time and 
so renders the shuttling possible. As readers, we get the 
uncanny feeling of being told and yet ignored by the teller at 
the same time. This ambivalence is already suggested by the 
title "Privacy," which can just as well refer to the privacy of 
a corner table as to the privacy of one's thoughts. 
 Sternberg's formulations come close to what Henrik Skov 
Nielsen (2004) has pointed out as the impersonal voice in first-
person  narration. Nielsen opposes the entrenched idea that in a 
narrative text, first-person reference as well as related 
From Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative edited by Lars Bernaerts, et al. by permission 
of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2013 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska.
264 
deictic elements, expressive markers,  and stylistic 
foregrounding necessarily presuppose a personified narrator-
figure. To overcome this narratological idée reçue, Nielsen 
provides a powerful addition to theories of first-person 
narration by suggesting the possibility of an unnatural, 
distinctively literary voice "which can talk about the 
protagonist in the first person" but which "neither belongs to 
the narrating-I nor to the narrated-I" (2004, 139). 
 Yet if we reopen the case of the potentially "triple 
voiced" sentence "I might suddenly have felt the urge to harm 
her, and easily could've," we could, paradoxically, use 
Nielsen's concept to naturalize the inconsistencies: perhaps it 
is actually the (momentarily intruding?) impersonal narrative 
voice that  is responsible for the evocation of a potentially 
violent atmosphere. This unattached voice may verbalize the 
thought of the old Chinese woman; and if that is the case, then 
it follows that neither the mind of the experiencing I nor that 
of his later self would necessarily "contain" any violent 
thought. Alternatively, the impersonal narrator may enunciate 
those thoughts of the experiencing I which, at the moment of 
recollection, seem alien to the protagonist. After all, he does 
not "remember all [he] thought," and neither is his mind or its 
contents what it used to be. A somewhat similar explanation is 
applicable to "Reunion": the impersonal narrative voice enables 
From Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative edited by Lars Bernaerts, et al. by permission 
of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2013 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska.
265 
the protagonist's misguided "narrative project," even if none of 
it appears worth telling from the point of view of the later 
self (whose presence in the discourse is, however, indicated by 
a deictic expression like "before Christmas last year"). 
 When interpreting these stories by Ford, I believe that, at 
least momentarily, "we are aware that as readers we read a 
narrative that need not ever take place on the level of the 
character" (Nielsen 2004, 143). However, Ford's stories 
highlight the fact that when discussing both cognition and 
literature, we should not drop the matter here. For Nielsen's 
arguments lead us to ask the next question: What does it mean 
for a narrative to "take place"?  This is also what Ford's two 
stories seem to be asking. Does narrative presuppose 
intentionality, organization, communication—or simply the 
activation of a cognitive schema? This may sometimes be the key 
interpretive problem posed by a fictional narrative. 
Construction(-mindedness) does not automatically suppose 
transmission(-mindedness), and I suggest that this fact is 
pointedly foregrounded in literary representations of cognitive 
mental functioning and experientiality. Unlike real-world 
confessors, fictional first-person narrators are not necessarily 
speaking for themselves, not even to themselves, but instead 
they demonstrate—in their involuntary discursivity—how the 
fictional mind is conditioned by verbalization and the 
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communicative structure of the narrative text. The narrators of 
the two stories share the apparent tendency to self-reflexively 
construct and frame their own experiences—as well as those of 
other people—up to a point where their shaky sketches 
approximate literary construction. Yet the literary minds 
inhabiting fictional universes are hardly ever aware of how 
literary, constructed,  and under public scrutiny they 
ultimately are, even if they were to show symptoms of mental 
exhibitionism. 
 
<A>Short Conclusion: On Missing the Point</A> 
So, why do we read fiction? Lisa Zunshine provides a persuasive 
answer in Why We Read Fiction (2006): to let fiction test and 
tease the same intersubjective skills (theory of mind)  we use 
in our social reality. However, one aspect Zunshine's theory 
does not cover is the literary illusion of the mind as 
verbalizable. In one sense, the minds of narrating or 
experiencing fictional agents always merge the representation 
with the represented: the mind is simultaneously both the 
performer and the arena of performance.  Such "schizoid" 
textuality, discussed at length here, may threaten the apparent 
connection between experience and narrative construction: in 
fact, many of the narrative strategies for representing 
consciousness seem to emphasize both the simultaneity and the 
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incongruence between real-time experience and its processing 
into a meaningful whole. 
 By merging lived experience with the construction of 
experience, Ford's stories point to the fact that there is no 
fixed point of construction, no true moment of absolute insight 
in life. While conventionally retrospective, these first-person 
narratives also make the process of narrative revision visible 
in a manner reminiscent of some present-tense narratives such as 
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians. To rephrase the concern of 
the narrator in "Reunion," the question of what is preliminary 
and what is primary in the course of our lives may ultimately be 
left unanswered, before the cycle closes. 
 
<A>Notes</A> 
1. Here I find Joseph Tabbi's distinction between "cognitive" 
and "cognitivist" approaches helpful: "The fears [of cognitive 
invasion in literary studies] are justified, but only so long as 
cognitive researchers remain inattentive to the particular 
language of literary works and their specific demands on 
readers. . . . Such a[n ignoring] view might be termed 
'cognitivist' rather than cognitive" (2004, 168–69). 
2. On the difference between conscious versus self-conscious (or 
audience-oriented versus self-oriented) unreliability in 
fictional narrators, see Marcus (2005; 2006). 
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